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Abstract
7KHDUWLFOHDGGUHVVHVWKHWKHRUHWLFDODQGHPSLULFDOUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]D-
tion and economic growth. An empirical analysis of Russian regions for 2005–2012 shows 
that excessive expenditure decentralization within the region, which is not accompanied 
E\WKHUHVSHFWLYHOHYHORIUHYHQXHGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\DQGQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHG
WRUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFJURZWK,QFRQWUDVWUHJLRQDOGHSHQGHQFHRQLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO¿VFDO





1. Introduction: Fiscal decentralization — theoretical aspects
)LVFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLVRQHRIWKHNH\FRQFHSWVLQWKHSXEOLF¿QDQFHWKHRU\
and a commonly used policy measure in public sector reforms. In federal states, 
¿VFDO GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ PHDQV WKDW UHYHQXH DQG H[SHQGLWXUH UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
(the right to impose and collect tax and independently determine the focus areas 
of expenses) are transferred from the federal to the regional and local levels.1 
 ً The updated English version of the article published in Russian in Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2016, No. 2, 
SS±7KLVSDSHULVSDUWO\EDVHGRQWKHDXWKRU¶V0DVWHU7KHVLVGHIHQGHGDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI%RQQXQGHU
WKHVXSHUYLVLRQRI3URI'U-UJHQYRQ+DJHQ<XVKNRY
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  3HHUUHYLHZXQGHUUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL
 1 'HSHQGLQJRQWKHFRQWH[W¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQFDQEHYLHZHGDVDSURFHVVWUDQVIHUULQJEXGJHWDU\DXWKR
rity) or as a state or result of such a process (scope of authority delegated to lower administrative levels with 





)LVFDO IHGHUDOLVP LVDPRUHJHQHUDOFRQFHSW WKDW UHSUHVHQWVDYHUWLFDO¿QDQFLDO
VWUXFWXUHRIWKHSXEOLFVHFWRU2DWHVZLWKUHYHQXHDQGH[SHQGLWXUHDVVLJQ-
ment among different levels of government and a system of intergovernmental 
WUDQVIHUV7KXV¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LVDPHFKDQLVPRI¿VFDO IHGHUDOLVPDQG
can be considered as a necessary condition of the latter because there is no point 
LQDYHUWLFDO¿QDQFLDOVWUXFWXUHRIWKHSXEOLFVHFWRUZLWKRXWDFHUWDLQOHYHORIGH-
centralization (in this case, all resources, authority and responsibilities are con-




should be responsible for macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribu-
tion, whereas subnational (regional and local) authorities, which are closer to 
citizens and possess more information on their preferences, should ensure the ef-
¿FLHQF\RISXEOLFJRRGVSURYLVLRQZLWKLQWKHLUMXULVGLFWLRQV0XVJUDYH
7KHNH\DUJXPHQW LQ IDYRURI¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LV WKHSRVVLELOLW\ WR LQ-
FUHDVH WKHDOORFDWLYH DQG SURGXFWLYH HI¿FLHQF\ RI SXEOLF JRRGV SURYLVLRQ
0DUWLQH]9DFTXH]DQG0F1DE2DWHV7KLHVVHQ7KHDOORFD-
WLYHHI¿FLHQF\RI WKHGHFHQWUDOL]HGSURYLVLRQRIPRVWSXEOLF VHUYLFHV LVKLJKHU
than that of the centralized provision because lower levels of government can 
improve the well-being of residents through a more comprehensive satisfaction 
of their individual needs (preference- matching argument). 7KHSURGXFWLYHHI¿-
ciency can also be higher under decentrali zation because subnational authorities, 
which have better knowledge of citizens’ needs and experience in providing re-
spective public goods, can produce such goods at lower cost.2 Another advantage 
RI¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLVWKHLQFUHDVHGKRUL]RQWDODQGYHUWLFDO¿VFDOFRPSHWL-
tion, which, in turn, may limit the size of the public sector and its predatory incen-
WLYHV%UHQQDQ%XFKDQDQ0RUHRYHUZLWKVWURQJGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQV
WUDQVSDUHQWHOHFWLRQVUXOHRIODZDQGDQHIIHFWLYHSDUOLDPHQWDU\V\VWHP¿VFDO
decentralization may encourage a higher accountability of subnational authorities 
DQGDQLPSURYHGTXDOLW\RIJRYHUQDQFH/RFNZRRG
,QFRQWUDVW¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQFDQEHGDQJHURXVXQGHUSDUWLFXODUFLUFXP-
stances (Prud’homme, 1995). Excessive decentralization makes macroeconomic 
stability and income redistribution nearly unachievable. In times of crises, mac-
roeconomic stabilization becomes problematic because the federal government 
GRHV QRW KDYH VXI¿FLHQW UHVRXUFHV WR VWDELOL]H WKHHFRQRP\ ZKHUHDV SRZHU-
IXO UHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVPD\KDYHGLIIHULQJRIWHQFRQWUDGLFWRU\¿VFDOSROLF\
priori ties. Income redistribution also does not work under full decentralization. 
Resources are usually unevenly distributed among territories (at least in large 
IHGHUDOVWDWHV7KHUHIRUHDODFNRIDFHQWUDOL]HGHTXDOL]DWLRQSROLF\FDQOHDGWR








DQG ORFDO OHYHOV LQFHUWDLQFRXQWULHV ORZFRPSHWHQFHVRIRI¿FLDOV FRUUXSWLRQ
DQGZHDNLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHUHIRUHLWLVTXHVWLRQDEOHZKHWKHUVXEQDWLRQDODXWKRUL-
WLHV FDQ DFKLHYH KLJK HI¿FLHQF\ LQ WKHSXEOLF SURGXFWLRQ$QRWKHU SUREOHP RI
decentralization is the inability of subnational governments to fully internalize 
cross-regional externalities, which raises doubt regarding the theoretical conclu-
VLRQVIRXQGLQWKHFODVVLFDOVWXGLHVRI¿VFDOIHGHUDOLVP2DWHV




centralization reforms in (former) socialist states in the late 1980s — early 1990s 
5XVVLDDQGIRUPHUUHSXEOLFVRIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQG&KLQD
The advocates of these reforms needed a theoretically and empirically justi-
¿HGUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHGHJUHHRIGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
WKHPRVW HDVLO\PHDVXUHG TXDQWLWDWLYH LQGLFDWRU RI HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW ,Q
WKHLU VHDUFK IRU VXFK D MXVWL¿FDWLRQ HFRQRPLVWV KDYH DQDO\]HG DQG DGDSWHG
YDULRXVHFRQRPLFJURZWKPRGHOVXVLQJWKHPWR¿QGDSRWHQWLDO OLQNEHWZHHQ
GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ DQG JURZWK DQG DSSO\LQJ YDULRXV HFRQRPHWULF WHFKQLTXHV WR
FRQ¿UPWKLVOLQNHPSLULFDOO\
5HVHDUFKHUVKDYHPRGL¿HGSRSXODUHFRQRPLFJURZWKPRGHOV6RORZPRGHO
%DUUR¶V HQGRJHQRXV JURZWK PRGHO DQG 'LDPRQG¶V RYHUODSSLQJ JHQHUDWLRQV
PRGHOWRLQFRUSRUDWHDSRWHQWLDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQG
HFRQRPLFJURZWK%UXHFNQHU'DYRRGLDQG=RX7KLHVVHQ
The most common analytical framework that links expenditure decentralization 
WRJURZWKLVDPRGHOGHYHORSHGE\'DYRRGLDQG=RXZKLFKLVDPRGL¿HG
YHUVLRQ RI%DUUR¶VPRGHO %DUUR $&REE'RXJODV SURGXFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ
has two inputs, namely private capital and public spending, by three levels of 
JRYHUQPHQW IHGHUDO VWDWH DQG ORFDO3XEOLF H[SHQGLWXUHV DUH¿QDQFHG WKURXJK
taxes on output. Maximizing the utility function of a representative agent with 
respect to a dynamic budget constraint provides the following solution: output 
growth rate depends, inter alia, on the shares of different levels of government in 
total public expenditure. From the model, it is also possible to calculate growth-
PD[LPL]LQJVKDUHVRISXEOLFVSHQGLQJ'DYRRGLDQG=RXFRQFOXGHWKDWLI
public expenditure is excessively centralized, decentralization can be conducive 
to economic growth.
The augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al., 1992) also provides the basis 
for econometric analysis of the relationship between decentralization and growth 
7KLHVVHQ  /LQ DQG /LX  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR VWDQGDUG GHWHUPLQDQWV RI
economic growth that are derived from the Solow model (initial output value, 
physical and human capital accumulation, and labor force growth), in the empiri-
FDOVSHFL¿FDWLRQ7KLHVVHQXVHVDGGLWLRQDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQPHDVXUHVDQG
other conditioning factors as independent variables.
%UXHFNQHU  XVHV 'LDPRQG¶V PRGHO WR VKRZ WKHDGYDQWDJHV RI GH-
FHQWUDOL]DWLRQWKHRUHWLFDOO\$K\SRWKHWLFDO'LDPRQG%UXHFNQHUZRUOGDWWLPH
t consists of two overlapping generations, the young and the old (each agent 
OLYHVIRUWZRSHULRGVEHLQJ\RXQJLQWKH¿UVWDQGROGLQWKHVHFRQG<RXQJLQ-
$<XVKNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
dividuals can invest part of their time in education because it raises their future 
income and can work the remainder of the time. In addition, a young generation 
FDQVDYHDVKDUHRIWKHLULQFRPHDQGLQYHVWLWLQSK\VLFDOFDSLWDO2OGLQGLYLGX-
als devote all of their time to work. A consumption bundle of each generation 
consists of two goods: private and public. The old generation, whose disposable 
income is higher ( because their level of human capital is higher, and they do 
not spend their time on schooling), can consume more, thus having higher de-
PDQGIRUWKHSXEOLFJRRG%UXHFNQHUWKHQFRPSDUHVWZRV\VWHPVGHFHQWUDOL]HG
(federalism ) and centra lized (unitary). Under federalism, it is assumed that 
a perfect Tiebout-sorting mechanism allows individuals to sort themselves in 
two demand-homogeneous jurisdictions with different levels of the public good 
provision (higher for old than for young). Under the unitary system, a common 
level of the public good is provided for all individuals. According to the propo-
sition presented by the author, the time spent on education and levels of physi-
FDOFDSLWDOLVKLJKHULQWKHIHGHUDOLVWHTXLOLEULXPWKDQLQDQ\XQLWDU\HTXLOLEUL-
um. Economic growth, determined by the human capital growth rate, is, hence, 
higher under federalism. This model, which is excessively abstract and cannot 
be implemented empirically, provides insights on how federalism (in the form 
RIGHFHQWUDOL]HGSXEOLFJRRGSURYLVLRQPD\SRVLWLYHO\LQÀXHQFHJURZWK
Summing up the previous research on the theoretical relationship between 
¿VFDO GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ DQG HFRQRPLF JURZWK %DVNDUDQ HW DO  LGHQWL-
fy four potential channels of this relationship: heterogeneity of preferences, 
market preservation, structural change, and political innovation. Heterogeneity 
of preferences LVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHG'LDPRQG%UXHFNQHUPRGHO
%UXHFNQHUMarket preservation PHDQVWKDW¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLQ-
FUHDVHV WKHKRUL]RQWDO ¿VFDO FRPSHWLWLRQ ZKLFK UHVWULFWV WKHQHJDWLYH LQFHQ-
tives of subnational authorities, improves the conditions for market develop-
ment, and ultimately accelerates economic growth. Structural change is related 
to potential positive effects of decentralization during structural crises (e.g., 
when there is a permanent negative demand shock encountered by a particular 
industry). Structural change is easier to implement under decentralization be-
FDXVHLQWKHFHQWUDOL]HGV\VWHPULVNDYHUVHRI¿FLDOVPD\KDYHDKLJKHULQWHUHVW
LQSURYLGLQJH[FHVVLYH¿QDQFLDODLG WR LQHI¿FLHQW LQGXVWULHVZKLFKSUHFOXGHV
VWUXFWXUDO UHIRUPV %HVOH\DQG&RDWHPolitical innovation means that 
¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQFUHDWHVFRQGLWLRQVIRUXVLQJUHJLRQVDVODERUDWRULHVIRU
HFRQRPLFH[SHULPHQWV2DWHV,IDSROLF\LQQRYDWLRQLVVXFFHVVIXOLQRQH
region, it may be further disseminated among other regions, which creates new 
opportunities for economic growth.
7KXVDWKHRUHWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGHFRQRPLF
JURZWKDSSHDUVWREHHVWDEOLVKHGDQGMXVWL¿HG,VWKHUHVROLGHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFH
of such a relationship?
7KHUHVXOWVRIQXPHURXVVWXGLHVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDO-





FRUUHODWHG DW DOO $VDWU\DQ DQG )HOG 7KRUQWRQ  ,Q FRQWHPSRUDU\
408 $<XVKNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
studies, researchers refer to the multidimensional nature of decentralization and 
¿QGWKDWH[SHQGLWXUHGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKDVDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQJURZWKZKHUHDV
revenue decentralization is positively related to the long-run growth prospects 
(in cases when expenditures are more decentralized than revenues). In other 
ZRUGV WKHFRQYHUJHQFHK\SRWKHVLV LV FRQ¿UPHG DFKLHYLQJ D EDODQFHEHWZHHQ
revenue and expenditure at regional and local levels is positively related to eco-
QRPLF JURZWK &DQWDUHUR HW DO  *HPPHO HW DO  5RGULJXH]3RVH
and Kroijer, 2009) and creates positive incentives for subnational authorities to 
 preserve market institutions (Jin et al., 2005).












V±HDUO\ VZKLFK DOORZV D JHQHUDO FRQFOXVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ D SRVLWLYH
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRIUHYHQXHVDQGH[SHQGLWXUHVRI&KLQHVH
SURYLQFHVDQGWKHLUHFRQRPLFJURZWK2WKHUUHVHDUFKHUVREWDLQDQRSSRVLWHUH-
sult: the convergence of subnational revenues and expenditures is negatively 
FRUUHODWHGZLWKHFRQRPLFJURZWKSURVSHFWVERWKXQGHUWKH¿VFDOFRQWUDFWV\VWHP
± DQGXQGHU WKHUHYHQXH DVVLJQPHQW V\VWHP ± -LQ DQG
=RX
$QDO\]LQJ WKHUHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ¿VFDO GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ DQG HFRQRPLF
growth in the USA, researchers also obtain contradictory results. For instance, 
VRPHXVHWKH'DYRRGL=RXPRGHODQGDQDO\]HµORQJ¶WLPHVHULHVGDWD±
and conclude that there is no strong link between expenditure decentralization and 
growth, i.e., the exiting degree of decentralization suits the purpose of maximizing 
HFRQRPLFJURZWK;LHHWDO2WKHUUHVHDUFKHUVXVHSDQHOGDWDDQDO\VLVRYHU
UHODWLYHO\ µVKRUW¶ WLPHSHULRGV ±DQGFRQ¿UP WKDW WKHUH LVDSRVLWLYH
relationship between both expenditure and revenue decentralization and economic 
growth at the state level (Akai and Sakata, 2002), as well as a negative correlation 
between the degree of decentralization and the volatility of economic growth in 
±$NDLHWDO
The analysis of the decentralization experience in Spain in 1985–2004 reveals 
a strong positive relationship between revenue decentralization and economic 
JURZWKDQGQROLQNEHWZHHQH[SHQGLWXUHGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGJURZWK&DQWDUHUR
DQG3HUH]*RQ]DOH]7KHDXWKRUVXVHVHYHUDO UREXVWQHVVFKHFNV WRFRQ-
¿UP WKHLU ¿QGLQJV LQFOXGLQJ WKHLQVWUXPHQWDO YDULDEOHV ,9 WHFKQLTXH WR DF-
count for the possible endogeneity between decentralization measures and eco-
nomic growth and the dynamic panel data model to control for the inclusion of 
WKHODJJHGGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLQWKHVHWRIUHJUHVVRUV$OORIWKHVHFKHFNVFRQ¿UP
the major results of the study.
409$<XVKNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí




x cross-section and time structure of data (number of countries or regions ana-
lyzed, time horizon, including the presence of structural shocks and crises in 
the time period considered);






x control variables included in the econometric model, i.e., determinants of eco-
QRPLFJURZWKLQLWLDO*'3RU*53OHYHOVSRSXODWLRQRU ODERUIRUFHJURZWK
rate, physical capital growth rate or share of investments in the physical capital 
LQ*'3WD[SUHVVXUHRQWKHHFRQRP\DQGRSHQQHVVLQGH[HWF²VHHVHPLQDO
SDSHUVRI%DUUR/HYLQHDQG5HQHOW
The main lessons that need to be learned from the numerous empirical studies 
described above are that the multidimensional nature of decentralization (at least 
its revenue and expenditure dimension) should be considered, and the major de-
terminants of economic growth should necessarily be included in the economet-
ric model to prevent the omitted variable bias.
3. Fiscal federalism development in the Russian Federation
7KHGHYHORSPHQW RI ¿VFDO IHGHUDOLVP LQ FRQWHPSRUDU\ 5XVVLD LV VLPLODU WR
a pendulum motion. The highly centralized budget system of the late Soviet Union 




companied by the preservation of political control over provinces by the central 
JRYHUQPHQW¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LQSRVW6RYLHW5XVVLDZDVDFFRPSDQLHGE\
political decentralization, whereas the recentralization of the budget system in 
WKHPLGVZDV DFFRPSDQLHG E\ SROLWLFDO FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ7KXV WKH&KLQHVH
model proposed for Russia by certain researchers and policy-makers was not at-
tempted in reality.
$GHWDLOHG GHVFULSWLRQRI¿VFDO IHGHUDOLVPGHYHORSPHQW LQ5XVVLD LV EH\RQG
the scope of this paper but covered extensively in Yushkov (2014). The most 
relevant studies on this issue include the report Intergovernmental Reforms in 
the Russian FederationE\WKH:RUOG%DQN'D6LOYDHWDODQGDUWLFOHVRI
OHDGLQJ5XVVLDQ %XNKYDOG (QLNRORSRYHWDO .DGRFKQLNRYHWDO
.OLPDQRYDQG/DYURY1D]DURY2UHNKRYVN\$OH[HHY
DQG.XUO\DQGVND\D)UHLQNPDQDQG3OHNKDQRY=KXUDYVND\D




and Yossifov, 1999; Shleifer, 2005; Solanko and Tekoniemi, 2005).
7KHHPSLULFDOVHFWLRQRIWKLVDUWLFOHFRQVLGHUVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ¿VFDO
decentralization and regional economic growth at the latest stage of development 
RI¿VFDOIHGHUDOLVPLQ5XVVLDIURPXQWLOQRZ7KLVVWDJHLVFKDUDFWHUL]HG
by the continuing recentralization of budget revenues and the increased depen-
dence of regions on intergovernmental transfers from the federal center.
4. Fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth in the Russian 
Federation (2005–2012): An empirical analysis
4.1. Data description
)RU WKHSXUSRVHVRI WKHHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVZHFROOHFWHGGDWDRQ5XVVLDQ
regions over the period from 2005 through 2012.47KHPDMRUVRXUFHVRI¿QDQ-
cial and economic statistics on Russian regions are the Russian Federal State 
Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 
and the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation. The key goal of the em-
SLULFDO DQDO\VLV LV WR LGHQWLI\ WKHGLUHFWLRQ DQG VLJQL¿FDQFH RI WKHUHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQG UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLFJURZWK LQ WKHSHULRGRI
further centra lization of the budget system and increasing economic volatility. 
7KHSHULRGRIDQDO\VLVLQFOXGHVERWKWKH¿QDOVWDJHRIWKHµIDW\HDUV¶IURP
WRHDUO\DQGWKHFULVLVSHULRGZLWKDVXEVHTXHQWPRGHUDWHUHFRYHU\IURP
ODWH  WR  7KHUHIRUH WR FRQ¿UP WKHRYHUDOO UHVXOW RI WKHUHJUHVVLRQ
analy sis, separate calculations for each of those periods are performed.
7KHJURZWKUDWHRI WKHJURVVUHJLRQDOSURGXFW *53SHUFDSLWDGRP_GR) is 
XVHGDVWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLQDOOWKHVSHFL¿FDWLRQV7KHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHV
that characterize the degree of decentralization include the intra regional revenue 
decentralization (DEC_1), which is the share of self-generated municipal rev-
enues (without transfers) in total revenues of the consolidated regional budget 5; 
intraregional expenditure decentralization (DEC_2), which is the share of consoli-
GDWHGPXQLFLSDOH[SHQGLWXUHV H[FOXGLQJ µEDFNZDUG¶ LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO WUDQVIHUV
to higher levels) in the total expenditures of the consolidated regional budget; de-
pendence of a region on intergovernmental transfers from the federal budget (IGT ), 
which is the share of intergovernmental transfers (unconditional grants, subsidies, 
subventions) in total revenues of the consolidated regional budget; and the muni-
cipal autonomy indicator (AU ), which is the share of self-generated revenues of all 




zation is proposed by Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2004) in which not only 
the share of revenues and expenditures in the consolidated subnational budget 
 4 Moscow and St. Petersburg are two federal cities that are excluded from the analysis because their budget 
VWUXFWXUHLVLQFRPSDUDEOHZLWKRWKHUUHJLRQV7\XPHQ2EODVWLQFOXGHVWZR$XWRQRPRXV2NUXJV<DPDOR1HQHWVN\
DQG.KDQW\0DQVL\VN\DQG$UNKDQJHOVN2EODVWLQFOXGHV1HQHWVN\$XWRQRPRXV2NUXJ
 5 The consolidated regional budget in Russia consists of the regional budget and consolidated municipal 
budgets (i.e., budgets of all municipalities present in the respective region). 
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are considered but also the real authority of regions and municipalities to im-
pose new taxes, to change tax rates, tax bases and federal tax deductions, and to 
HVWDEOLVKWKHLURZQVSHQGLQJSULRULWLHV+RZHYHU WKLVDSSURDFKFDQQRWEHVXF-
cessfully applied in this paper because it is tailored primarily to cross-country 
FRPSDULVRQVDQGZLOOQRWOHDGWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIDYDULDEOHZLWKVXI¿FLHQWinter-
regional variation in the degree of decentralization. The reason is that regions and 
muni cipalities LQWKHH[LVWLQJ5XVVLDQV\VWHPRI¿VFDOIHGHUDOLVPKDYHextremely 
 limited authority over revenues and expenditures and cannot impose new taxes or 
change the tax base (particular tax rates may be changed but only within narrow 
limits), whereas spending priorities are often imposed by the federal government 
(in other words, such a sophisticated variable will tend to zero for most regions).
$GGLWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHV LQFOXGH WKHVKDUHRI LQYHVWPHQWVLQ¿[HG
DVVHWVLQ*53INV_SHARE ); the regional share of total natural resource pro-
duction (RES_SHARE ); the tax burden or tax pressure, measured by the share 
RI WD[ UHYHQXHV LQ *53 TAX_IN_GRP); the regional population growth 
(POP_GROWTH ); the trade openness ratio of the regional economy, the ratio of 
H[SRUWVDQGLPSRUWVWR*53OPENNESS); one of the possible indicators of hu-
man capital development, i.e., the share of higher educational institutions grad-
uates in total population of the region (ALUMNI WKHLQÀDWLRQ LQGH[ INFL); 
DQGDORJDULWKPRIWKHODJJHGYDOXHRI*53SHUFDSLWDGRP_PC_LAG ) to test 
the conditional convergence hypothesis.
A few key conclusions should be noted regarding the descriptive statistics. 
First, the degree of intraregional expenditure decentralization far exceeds the de-
gree of revenue decentralization (average level of DEC_2 over 8 years is 50%; 
DEC_1 —7KDWLVWKHUHLVDVLJQL¿FDQWJDSUHYHQXHVDUHFRQFHQWUDWHGDW
WKHUHJLRQDOOHYHOZKHUHDVH[SHQGLWXUHVDUHHTXDOO\GLYLGHGEHWZHHQUHJLRQVDQG
municipalities. In other words, the municipal tax base does not correspond to its 
spending authority.6 Second, the dependence of regions on transfers from the fed-
HUDOEXGJHWLVVLJQL¿FDQWWUDQVIHUVFRQVWLWXWHDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIUHJLRQDOEXG-
get revenues). Third, the average annual economic growth rates over the period 
RILQWHUHVWÀXFWXDWHGVXEVWDQWLDOO\IURPLQWRLQZKHUHDV
the average rate of population growth was negative during the entire eight years.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the most important variables presented 
above (average values) for the 10 best and 10 worst regions in terms of regional 
HFRQRPLF JURZWK LQ ±7KHVKDUH RI LQYHVWPHQWV LQ ¿[HG DVVHWV LQ
*53LVVXEVWDQWLDOO\KLJKHULQWKHOHDGLQJUHJLRQVWKDQLQWKHRXWVLGHU





WLRQDO FRQYHUJHQFH K\SRWKHVLV ³SRRU´ UHJLRQV JURZ IDVWHU WKDQ ³ULFK´ RQHV
Nevertheless, there are exceptions that reject this hypothesis: Sakhalin Region 










WKHH[SHQGLWXUH GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LQ WKHOHDGLQJ UHJLRQV ZDV  ORZHU WKDQ LQ
the outsider regions, whereas the average dependence on transfers from the fed-
HUDOEXGJHWLQWKHOHDGLQJUHJLRQVLVKLJKHUWKDQLQRXWVLGHUUHJLRQV
Thus, based on the descriptive statistics analysis, it is possible to conclude that 
decentralization was negatively related to growth in Russian regions in the se-
lected time period, whereas the dependence on transfers during the crisis was 
SRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWK*53JURZWKSHUFDSLWD7KHVHFRQFOXVLRQVQHHGWREH
YHUL¿HGDVSDUWRIWKHSDQHOGDWDDQDO\VLV
Table 1 demonstrates the heterogeneity of Russian regions in terms of the de-
gree of intraregional revenue (to a greater extent) and expenditure decentral-
ization. The varying degrees of decentralization may be caused by the general 
economic heterogeneity of regions (following, inter alia, from differences in 
the natural resource endowments): relatively poor regions are characterized by 
low living standards and low value of property, which raises problems with col-
OHFWLQJORFDOWD[HVDQGH[SODLQVWKHLULQVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQWKHFRQVROLGDWHGUHJLRQ-





tion within a region has a relatively high correlation with revenue decentraliza-
tion; as a general rule, the more income a municipality generates, the greater 
share of expenditures in the consolidated regional budget it takes. Moreover, dif-
ferences in expenditure decentralization are caused by the different approaches 
towards allocating authority between the region and municipalities, which vary 
across Russian regions.
4.2. Empirical methodology
7KHIROORZLQJ HPSLULFDO DQDO\VLV LV ORRVHO\ EDVHGRQ WKH'DYRRGL=RX DQD-
O\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN'DYRRGL=RX1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHIUDPHZRUNKDVEHHQ
PRGL¿HGFRQVLGHUDEO\7KHJHQHUDOIRUPXODIRUWKHUHJUHVVLRQHTXDWLRQLV
GRP_GRit = Įi + Ȝt + ȕD  DECit + ȕT  TAXit + ȖcXit + İit ,
where GRP_GRitLVD*53JURZWKSHUFDSLWDLQWKHUHJLRQi in year t; Įi denotes 
WKHXQREVHUYHG UHJLRQDO¿[HGHIIHFWVȜt is the vector of time effects (dummy 
variables); DECitLVRQHRIWKHLQGLFDWRUVRI¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ8; TAXit indi-
  Including time effects in the regression model is extremely important for the period of interest (2005–2012) 
because it allows to control IRUWKHLPSDFWRIH[RJHQRXVPDFURHFRQRPLFVKRFNVDQGF\FOLFDOÀXFWXDWLRQVRI







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cates the tax burden; and Xit is a set of basic and additional control variables. 
The basic independent variables (determinants of economic growth) include 
SRSXODWLRQJURZWKWKHVKDUHRILQYHVWPHQWVLQ*53WKHORJDULWKPRIWKUHH\HDU
ODJJHGYDOXHVRI*53SHUFDSLWDDQGDSUR[\RIKXPDQFDSLWDOLQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWK WKHDSSURDFK XVHG LQ /HYLQH DQG 5HQHOW  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKHWUDGH
RSHQQHVVUDWLRLQÀDWLRQUHJLRQDOFRQVXPHUSULFHLQGH[DQGWKHUHJLRQDOVKDUH
of total natural resource production are used as additional conditioning factors. 
Unemployment is not considered as a control variable in this study due to two 
UHDVRQV¿UVWLWLVKLJKO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHODJJHG*53SHUFDSLWDVHFRQGLW
may cause an endogeneity problem due to its bi-directional causality with eco-
nomic growth.9
7KHSDQHO GDWD PRGHO LV HVWLPDWHG LQ WKH¿[HGHIIHFWV IUDPHZRUN )(10 
The disadvantage of the FE model is that it is impossible to analyze an impact of 
WLPHLQYDULDQWLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVHJWKHEDVLFOHYHORI*53SHUFDSLWDRU
dummy variables for federal districts). Nonetheless, the advantage of this model 
is that the unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., the entire set of time-invariant factors, 
LVLPSOLFLWO\FRQWUROOHGWKURXJK¿[HGHIIHFWV




The intraregional expenditure decentralization (column 2) is negatively and 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\DWUHODWHGWRUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFJURZWKZKHUHDVWKHUHJLRQ¶V
dependence on transfers from the federal budget (column 4) is positively and sig-
QL¿FDQWO\DWOLQNHGWRJURZWK11 The remaining decentralization measures 
DUHLQVLJQL¿FDQWLQWKHUHJUHVVLRQV
These results imply that government expenditures in Russian regions are ex-
cessively decentralized, which causes a negative relationship between expendi-
ture decentralization and regional economic growth. At the same time, self-gen-
erated revenues of municipalities are only 50% of their total revenues (the second 
KDOIFRQVLVWVRILQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOWUDQVIHUV7KXVPXQLFLSDOLWLHVODFNVXI¿FLHQW





the intraregional revenue decentralization and the growth of real industrial pro-
duction (1992–1996) (Freinkman and Yossifov, 1999). It should be noted that 
 9 Multicollinearity is not an issue here because independent variables in the regression are not highly 
FRUUHODWHGRQO\WZRFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVH[FHHG
 10 7KH+DXVPDQ WHVW UHVXOWV VKRZ WKDW WKHUDQGRPHIIHFWV PRGHO 5( LV LQFRQVLVWHQW IRU WKHPRGHO RI
interest.
 11 7RYHULI\ WKHUHVXOWV VHSDUDWH UHJUHVVLRQVZHUH UXQ IRUERWKSHULRGV WKHµIDW\HDUV¶DQG WKHFULVLVSHULRG
ZLWKVXEVHTXHQWUHFRYHU\VHHDERYH7KHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQPHDVXUHVDQG
economic growth remained the same.+RZHYHUWKHQHJDWLYHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQH[SHQGLWXUHGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ
DQGJURZWKLVPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWGXULQJWKHµIDW\HDUV¶
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these authors consider a shorter time period and do not include most of the nec-
essary control variables in their analysis, which leads to the omitted variable 
bias. The difference between our results can also be explained by the fact that in 
±DVLJQL¿FDQWLQVWLWXWLRQDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRFFXUUHGZLWKLQWKHHQWLUH
V\VWHPRI¿VFDOIHGHUDOLVPDVWURQJIRUPDOL]DWLRQRIWKHEXGJHWSURFHVVFRQ-
centration of resources and authority at the federal level, and minimization of 
opportunities for regions to engage in political bargaining for authority and in-
WHUJRYHUQPHQWDOWUDQVIHUVLQDGGLWLRQUHJLRQDODQGPXQLFLSDO¿VFDODXWRQRP\
ZDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHGXFHG
At the same time, a high dependence of a region on intergovernmental trans-
fers is positively correlated with economic growth (or, conversely, negative-
O\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK HFRQRPLF VWDJQDWLRQ 7KLV UHVXOW FRQ¿UPV WKH¿QGLQJV RI
=XEDUHYLFK ZKRDUJXHV WKDW UHJLRQV WKDWZHUHGHSHQGHQWRQ WUDQVIHUV
LQFOXGLQJWKH)DU(DVWDQG1RUWK&DXFDVXVVXIIHUHGOHVVIURPWKH¿QDQFLDODQG




(DEC_1) (DEC_2) (AU ) (IGT )
DEC_VAR –0.0422 –0.0559** –0.0169 0.0824*
(–1.00) (–2.12) ± (1.81)
POP_GR ± ± –0.0029 ±
(–0.91) ± (–0.84) (–1.01)
INV_SHARE ** 0.0820** 0.0886** **
(2.42)  (2.58) 
TAX_IN_GRP ±*** ±*** ±*** –0.2026**
± ± ± (–2.46)
GRP_PC_LAG –0.1156*** –0.1156*** –0.1160*** –0.1109***
± ± ± ±
ALUMNI * 4.8654* * *
   
INFL_T–1 ±** ±** ±** ±**
(–2.10) (–2.20) (–2.15) (–2.29)
SHARE_RES 0.5641*** 0.5226*** *** 0.5841***
 (2.64)  (2.82)
OPENNESS –0.0194 –0.0192 ± ±*
(–1.51) (–1.50) ± ±
&RQVWDQW *** *** *** 1.2218***
(4.02)   
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
2EVHUYDWLRQV    
R2 0.6149 0.6156  






/HYHOVRIVLJQL¿FDQFH* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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SDSHU HIIHFW ³PRQH\ VWLFNVZKHUH LW KLWV´ UHGXFHV WKHH[FHVVLYH H[SHQGLWXUH
decentralization within a region. For instance, a regional government receives 
DQ DGGLWLRQDO XQFRQGLWLRQDO HTXDOL]DWLRQ WUDQVIHU LQ WLPHV RI FULVLV 7KHQ E\
WKHÀ\SDSHUHIIHFWWKHWUDQVIHULVVSHQWGLUHFWO\E\WKHUHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWIRU










7KHVKDUH RI LQYHVWPHQWV LQ*53 DQG KXPDQ FDSLWDO SUR[\ DUH SRVLWLYHO\ DQG
VLJQL¿FDQWO\UHODWHGWRHFRQRPLFJURZWKZKLFKFRQ¿UPVWKH¿QGLQJVRISUHYLRXV
VWXGLHV%DUUR/HYLQHDQG5HQHOW
6LPLODU ¿QGLQJV DUH REWDLQHG IRU rentier regions (transfer-dependent regions 
DQGUHJLRQVZLWKDKLJKVKDUHRIQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVLQ*53VHHDOVR)UHLQNPDQ
and Plekhanov, 2008a,b) in which the negative correlation between expenditure 
GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGJURZWKLVPRUHVLJQL¿FDQW1HYHUWKHOHVVUHJLRQVWKDWH[WUDFW
natural resources recovered faster after the crisis and grew faster (positive and sig-
QL¿FDQWFRHI¿FLHQWIRUWKHRES_SHARE variable), which was most likely caused 
by the favorable conditions in the energy market.
5HWXUQLQJWRWKHFKDQQHOVRIFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ¿VFDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQG
economic growth described in the theoretical part of the article, we can assume 
that they do not function HI¿FLHQWO\LQWKHPRGHUQ5XVVLDQV\VWHPRI¿VFDOIHG-
eralism. Market preservation is not working (and did not work in the 1990s, 
VHH=KXUDYVND\DEHFDXVHORFDODXWKRULWLHVKDYHQRLQFHQWLYHVWRGHYHORS
markets and encourage business activity; an increased tax base (resulting from 
faster market development) will lead to reduced transfers from higher level bud-
gets. The heterogeneity of preferences only works in relation to major cities and 
WKHZHDOWKLHVWUHJLRQVWKDWFDQDWWUDFWTXDOL¿HGZRUNIRUFHDQG\RXQJVSHFLDOLVWV
Political innovations may be used by the federal center in the future to conduct 
economic experiments (e.g., to introduce new local taxes), although currently, 
this channel also does not function properly. The structural change channel does 
QRWZRUN LQ5XVVLDEHFDXVH LQHI¿FLHQWFRPSDQLHVDQG LQGXVWULHVFRQWLQXRXVO\
receive support in times of crises (bailouts) both from subnational and federal 
EXGJHWV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHFXUUHQWLQWUDUHJLRQDOGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGWKHV\VWHP
of intergovernmental relations GR QRW DOORZ WKHDGYDQWDJHV RI ¿VFDO IHGHUDO-
ism to be fully realized in the Russian Federation, thus slowing down economic 
growth and impeding consistent development of regions and municipalities.
7KLV DUWLFOH LOOXVWUDWHV WKHFXUUHQW VLWXDWLRQ ZLWK ¿VFDO GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LQ
Russian regions and its potential link to regional economic growth. Identifying 
a clear causal relationship between decentralization and growth (or, more broadly , 
development) and solving the issues of dual causality and endogeneity in the model 
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